Buffalo Law Review
Volume 64

Number 2

Article 3

4-1-2016

The Validity of Restraints on Alienation in an Oil and Gas Lease
Luke Meier
Baylor Law School

Rory Ryan
Baylor Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Contracts Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real
Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Luke Meier & Rory Ryan, The Validity of Restraints on Alienation in an Oil and Gas Lease, 64 Buff. L. Rev.
305 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol64/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

The Validity of Restraints on Alienation in an Oil and
Gas Lease
LUKE MEIER†
RORY RYAN††
INTRODUCTION
A new clause is starting to appear more frequently in oil
and gas leases. This Article considers whether that clause is
enforceable.
Landowners—when approached by companies about the
possibility of an oil and gas lease—are more frequently requiring that the lease contain a restriction on the company’s
ability to transfer the lease rights to a third party.1 By bargaining for this clause, landowners assume that they have
prevented unwanted transfers of the lease interest. Whether
they have achieved this desired result, however, is unclear
under existing law.2
† Professor of Law, Baylor Law School.
†† Professor of Law, Baylor Law School.
1. See Mark K. Glasser & Scott Humphrey, The Assignment of Oil and Gas
Leases: Conditions, Constraints, and Consequences § 4.01, at 120-21, in CTR. FOR
AM. & INT’L LAW, SIXTY-SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW (2011)
(“As landmen, lawyers, and others involved in purchasing oil and gas leases are
aware, today’s landowners have become increasingly sophisticated with respect
to the development of their mineral rights. More often than in years past, landowners today seek legal advice regarding the negotiation and enforcement of
those rights. That advice commonly includes a recommendation that lessors endeavor to prohibit or restrict the transferability of leasehold interests.”). Traditionally, the extractor’s right to alienate the lease interest was expressly provided
for in the lease. See, e.g., RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 9.8
(3d ed. 1991) (“The oil and gas lease customarily provides that the interest of either the lessor or lessee may be assigned so long as it does not increase the burdens of the lessee.”).
2. There is limited existing authority on this question. This limited authority
is split. Cf. Outlaw v. Bowen, 285 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (holding
that a restraint on the alienability of a fee simple absolute mineral interest is
invalid, but not addressing or discussing the validity of a restraint on alienability
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Whether these clauses should be enforced is a difficult
question.3 The difficulty derives from the sue generis nature
of the oil and gas lease. An oil and gas lease accomplishes a
task and creates a relationship that is unlike any other legal

of a lease mineral interest). Compare Harding v. Viking Int’l Res. Co., 1 N.E.3d
872, 878 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (upholding a restraint on alienation), and HOWARD
R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 402 (Patrick H. Martin &
Bruce M. Kramer, eds., 2014) (stating that restraints on alienation “appear generally to be sustained” and listing cases), with Shields v. Moffitt, 683 P.2d 530,
534 (Okla. 1984) (holding that a restriction on the lessee’s ability to transfer the
oil and gas lease was void as an illegal restraint on alienability).
3. The topic has received relatively little scholarly attention thus far. See
Gary B. Conine, Property Provisions of the Operating Agreement—Interpretation,
Validity, and Enforceability, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1263, 1380-81 (1988) (briefly
discussing the issue and acknowledging that the rule against illegal restraints on
alienability applies to the oil and gas context, but concluding that “[a]s long as
the restraint is indirect and ancillary to a legitimate commercial purpose, it is
likely that the restriction will survive the rule against restraint”); Glasser &
Humphrey, supra note 1, § 4.02 at 130 (acknowledging that there are no Texas
cases that directly address the question, but arguing that there is “little doubt
that Texas courts will not enforce consent-to-assign clauses of any nature in the
context of an oil and gas lease”); Robert E. Nowack, Restrictions Against Alienation in Agreements Relating to Oil and Gas Interests, 23 ALTA. L. REV. 62, 62-74
(1985) (discussing the issue under Canadian law); David E. Pierce, An Analytical
Approach to Drafting Assignments, 44 SW. L.J. 943, 949-50 (1990) (briefly discussing the issue and offering suggestions for how to draft a transfer prohibition to
increase the chances that it will be upheld and enforced); David Pierce, Evaluating & Drafting Oil & Gas Lease Assignments, 4 NAT’L ASS’N DIVISION ORD.
ANALYSIS 385, 399-412 (1992) (acknowledging the legitimate reasons a landowner
might want to restrict alienation of the oil and gas lease, but suggesting ways to
achieve some of these objectives other than by an alienation restraint). Although
all three Restatements of Property have devoted considerable attention to the legality of restraints on alienability, how this law applies in the context of an oil
and gas lease has not been addressed. (The general topic of oil and gas has not
been addressed in a restatement.) Most oil and gas hornbook writers skip over
the issue entirely, often on the assumption that most oil and gas leases specifically permit—rather than restrict—transfers of the interest created. See, e.g.,
HEMINGWAY, supra note 1, § 9.8 (“The oil and gas lease customarily provides that
the interest of either the lessor or lessee may be assigned so long as it does not
increase the burdens of the lessee.”). This assumption seems to be less valid now
than it was previously. See Glasser & Humphrey, supra note 1, § 4.01, at 120.
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relationship.4 This relationship straddles the line between
“contract” and “property.”5
But contract law and property law treat restrictions on
transfers differently. Under contract law, a clause prohibiting the transfer of contractual duties will usually be enforced.6 Under property law, however, the treatment of such
a restriction—termed a “restraint on alienability”—is more
nuanced.7
Every property lawyer knows that Uncle Scrooge cannot
do the following in his will: “Blackacre to my nephew Huey,
but he is not to sell the property.” The restraint on Huey’s
ability to alienate his interest (a fee interest) in Blackacre is
invalid and is thus stricken from the will. As a result, Huey
gets Blackacre free of the restraint.
But property law is equally clear that a landlord can restrict a residential tenant from transferring a leasehold estate without the landlord’s consent. Indeed, the law views
this situation as so different than Scrooge’s that in some jurisdictions a tenant must obtain the landlord’s consent to alienate the leasehold interest even if no clause in the contract
prohibits the transfer.8
All of the above labels—contract, fee, lease—are used by
jurisdictions to describe the relationship between landowner
and oil and gas producer. These labels, however, should not
4. See Jennifer N. Cooper, The Discovery Rule: Should Oil and Gas Leases Be
Different?, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1283, 1300 (2001) (“Oil and gas leases are unique
from other types of leases or contracts.”).
5. See 2 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 22.4(a)
(1989) (“If the oil and gas lease were not a complex instrument, it would be possible to reach trustworthy conclusions by analogy to other areas of the law. If the
lease could be classified as a conveyance of an interest in land and nothing else,
it would be possible to invoke the law relating to . . . conveyances generally. If the
lease could be classified as an executory contract and nothing else, it would be
possible to invoke the law relating to . . . executory contracts.”).
6. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
7. See infra pp. 318-19 and notes 39-42.
8. See Joshua Stein, Assignment and Subletting Restrictions in Leases and
What They Mean in the Real World, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 15 n.54 (2009)
(listing state statutes).
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be mechanically applied to resolve the validity of restraints
in an oil and gas lease. The resolution to this question is too
important for such a superficial analysis. Instead, the practical realities of the relationship created between the landowner and the oil and gas company should determine
whether transfer restrictions should be upheld and enforced
by the courts.
Ultimately, we conclude that alienation restraints in
mineral leases should generally be enforced. Before proceeding, let us emphatically emphasize the scope of this conclusion. A company that wishes to develop minerals can always
bargain for a clause that allows it to assign its interest. Such
a clause would undoubtedly be enforceable.9 And, a lease that
is silent as to alienability would, by default, result in an alienable interest. The situation we address is different. Our
situation is one where the landowner has expressly bargained for a clause that gives her the right to consent to future transfers of the extractor’s interest. In this situation, the
clause should be enforced. The extractor should not be able
to agree to the clause, presumably pay less because of the restrictions imposed by the clause, and then avoid the clause
as an unreasonable restraint on alienability.
The organization of this Article is as follows: Part I explains the necessity of ignoring labels when resolving
whether alienation restraints within an oil and gas lease are
enforceable. Part II examines the relationship between landowner and extractor. There, we attempt to describe the relationship created by a typical oil and gas lease without the use
of labels. We do this to facilitate the analysis in Part III,
where the underlying principles of alienability law are applied to this relationship. Part IV concludes by explaining
why the enforcement of alienation restraints in the oil and
gas context will not interfere with the functioning of the oil
and gas industry.

9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1, intro.
note (AM. LAW INST. 1983).
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH SUBSTITUTING LABELS FOR ANALYSIS
We begin with a plea to courts, lawyers, and commentators: avoid the temptation to resolve the validity of alienation
restraints in an oil and gas lease by a simple resort to labels.10
As we will explain in Part II, the nature of the relationship
between landowner and extractor is unique.11 As such, there
is a natural tendency for judges, academics, and lawyers to
borrow familiar terms and concepts when confronting disputes in this context.
The particular labels a jurisdiction has happened to apply to an oil and gas lease, however, should not determine the
validity of an alienation restraint in an oil and gas lease.
Courts use contract labels, property labels, or a mixture of
the two when resolving disputes arising from an oil and gas
lease.12 Regardless of the terms used within a particular jurisdiction, however, the real-world relationship created between landowner and operator remains the same across jurisdictions. It is the nature of this relationship, rather than
the labels a jurisdiction has happened to use in describing
this relationship, that should govern the legality of alienation
restraints in an oil and gas lease.
For the rest of this Article, we will abide with the plea
made in this Part. The most common label applied to the relationship between landowner and extractor is the term
“lease.” Because the black-letter law almost always upholds

10. Professors Martin and Kramer have termed this style of analysis as a
“seemingly simple syllogistic logic.” WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, § 201.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See, e.g., Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 616 N.W.2d 861, 864 (N.D. 2000) (stating that contract doctrines are applicable when interpreting a lease); Byron C.
Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product Doctrine: Just
What Is the “Product”?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 7 (2005) (“Most states have agreed
that an oil and gas lease gives the lessee not only a contractual right to explore
for oil and gas, but also an interest in property.”); David E. Pierce, Incorporating
a Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence Into the “Modern” Oil and Gas Lease,
33 WASHBURN L.J. 786, 792 n.21 (1994) (explaining that there are different ways
to characterize the property interest involved in an oil and gas lease).
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a landlord’s restraint of a tenant’s right to alienate,13 it would
be tempting to conclude that an oil and gas “lease” should
automatically be controlled by this clearly-established law.
This type of superficial reliance on labels, however,
would obscure the important policy considerations at stake.
Granted, an oil and gas “lease” does share some common
characteristics with the typical residential or commercial
leases on which the law of landlord-tenant has arisen. It
would distort reality, however, to suggest that an oil and gas
“lease” was (1) identical to a landlord’s lease of an apartment
unit to a university student, and (2) that these two distinct
relationships should be treated alike with regard to any legal
issue that might arise.14
Thus, the ubiquitous use of the label “lease” to describe
the relationship between landowner and extractor should not
determine the validity of restraints on alienation in this context. Instead, it is the practical realities of this relationship
that should control.
While the “lease” label suggests (superficially) that an oil
and gas alienation restraint should be enforced, other labels
might be used (superficially) to invalidate a restraint. This
was the result in Shields v. Moffitt.15 In Shields, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered the validity of the following
restraint in an oil and gas lease: “This lease may be assigned
only with the written consent of the lessors.”16 Because this
clause did not provide for any specific forfeiture remedy in
the event of the tenant’s attempted alienation (and because
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
note (AM. LAW INST. 1983).

OF

PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1, intro.

14. See Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. Am. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2003) (“In
Texas it has long been recognized that an oil and gas lease is not a ‘lease’ in the
traditional sense of a lease of the surface of real property.”); WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 2, § 207 (“It is one thing, however, to use the label ‘lease’ as a shorthand expression which encompasses many aspects of the jural relationship of lessor and lessee and another to use the syllogism frequently employed by the courts
and by advocates, viz, (1) a given right-duty or other relationship arises from a
lease, (2) this is a lease, (3) therefore this right-duty or other relationship exists.”).
15. Shields v. Moffitt, 683 P.2d 530 (Okla. 1984).
16. Id. at 531.
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the clause obviously involved more than a mere contractual
promise), the Court correctly determined that the clause was
a disabling restraint.17
After correctly identifying the type of restraint involved
in Shields, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rather
mechanically applied the rule that disabling restraints are
usually invalid.18 To support this conclusion, the Court cited
a previous Oklahoma Supreme Court case—Lohmann v. Adams19—that had applied the rule voiding disabling restraints
on alienation.20 The Lohmann case, however, did not involve
an oil and gas lease.21 Despite this, the Shields court made no
attempt to determine whether this factual distinction mattered. In the Shields opinion, there is absolutely no discussion of why disabling restraints are usually invalidated and
whether those reasons apply to an oil and gas lease.22 As we
17. Id. at 534 (“We likewise express no view herein as to what effect a forfeiture
or penalty clause might have resulted had it accompanied the clause in the lease
purporting to restrict right of sale without the consent of the plaintiffs/assignors.”).
18. Id. (“We hold that the lease clause in the case at bar purporting to restrict
alienation by the lessee of the oil and gas lease without the consent of the lessors
is void and of no force or effect.”).
19. Lohmann v. Adams, 540 P.2d 552 (Okla. 1975).
20. Shields, 683 P.2d at 534 (citing Lohmann, 540 P.2d at 557).
21. The Lohmann case did not even involve a land lease, let alone an oil and
gas lease. See Lohmann, 540 P.2d at 553. The “rule” against disabling restraints
on alienation does not usually apply to disabling restraints on a leasehold interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1, intro. note
(AM. LAW INST. 1983) (“The validity of . . . restraints on the tenant is generally
recognized.”); id. § 4.1 rep.’s note at 10 (discussing the modern trend in favor of
enforcing disabling restraints in commercial transfers, particularly with regard
to “leases in cooperative housing developments”). Thus, even outside the unique
relationships created by an oil and gas lease, context matters in applying the traditional “rules” as to the validity of restraints on alienability.
22. See generally Shields, 683 P.2d 530. Even ignoring the oil and gas context
involved in Shields, it is not entirely clear that the “rule” invalidating disabling
restraints was applicable in that case. Although the restraint was properly characterized by the court as a disabling restraint, the court failed to consider that it
was a partial disabling restraint rather than an absolute disabling restraint. The
clause in Shields did not absolutely prohibit transfer, but prohibited transfer only
without the landowner’s consent. Under the “emerging rule,” a landlord’s refusal
to give consent under this type of clause must be commercially reasonable. See
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will show later in this Article, the reason that disabling restraints are usually invalid simply does not apply to the typical oil and gas lease.23 Therefore, the Shields court’s blind
reliance on the “disabling restraint” label led the court to the
wrong conclusion.
A similar result could occur in a jurisdiction using the
“fee simple” label to describe the duration of the landownerextractor relationship. For instance, under firmly-established Texas case law, an oil and gas lease creates a fee simple determinable estate in the lessee.24 Because of the general
presumption that restraints on a fee simple are usually invalid,25 it would be tempting to conclude that a restraint on an
extractor’s interest under an oil and gas lease is invalid in
Texas (or in any jurisdiction applying the “fee simple defeasible” label to an oil and gas lease). This conclusion, however,
would elevate form over substance and eschew rigorous analysis for simple labels. As we will demonstrate later in this
Article, the reason that restraints on fee simple estate are
usually invalidated does not apply to the interest created in

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 829 n.184 (2001) (describing the emerging view); see also
supra note 3 (discussing case law on this issue). In this sense, then, a consent-totransfer clause does not prohibit transfers to all third parties, even without the
landlord’s consent. The rule generally prohibiting disabling restraints does not
apply with as much force to this type of partial restraint. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1983) (stating that
a disabling restraint is invalid if it makes a transfer “impossible,” but articulating
a balancing test based on the “legal policy favoring freedom of alienation” if the
disabling restraint does not make subsequent transfers impossible); id. at cmt. a
(“An absolute and unbending rule of law is likely to carry down with it more than
is necessary to achieve the objectives which led to the adoption of the rule in the
first place. The [balancing test for disabling restraints that do not make a subsequent transfer impossible] is a recognition of this fact and upholds a disabling
restraint in a limited area where justification for it may be found.”). As discussed
in the previous footnote, context matters in determining the validity of restraints
on alienability.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 106-09.
24. See Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717, 722 (Tex. 1915).
25. See Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete” Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 567 n.76 (1991) (stating the presumption).
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the typical oil and gas lease.26 As such, a court would err in
supposing that this type of restraint is invalid simply because
the label “fee” has sometimes been used by the courts to describe the duration of the interest created. The practical realities of an oil and gas lease—not labels—should determine
the validity of restraints on alienability.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LANDOWNER AND
EXTRACTOR
When it comes to legal classification, an oil and gas lease
is part contract and part conveyance.27 Property law applies,
but so does contract law. Labels from either branch of the
common law are often harmlessly applied. But this Part
avoids these labels. In fact, it avoids, to the extent possible,
references to any sort of law at all. As explained above, these
labels (harmlessly affixed in most other contexts), distract
from the realities of the relationship between a mineral
owner and her lessee. And these realities, not best-available
labels, are what must drive Part III’s attempt to apply alienability principles to this relationship.
When a person owns a piece of land, unless the minerals
have been severed, she owns both the surface and the minerals (riches) that lie beneath. Let us evaluate from the perspective of a ranch owner. On the surface is the ranch house,
the roads, the cattle, the tanks where the kids fish, the land
where guests hunt, or perhaps just beautifully preserved aesthetics. Lying beneath is the oil. That oil can be turned into
money. But the ranch owner cannot reach it with a shovel.
Most people who own minerals are utterly incompetent to

26. See infra Part III.B-D.
27. See KUNTZ, supra note 5, § 22.4(a) (“If the oil and gas lease were not a complex instrument, it would be possible to reach trustworthy conclusions by analogy
to other areas of the law. If the lease could be classified as a conveyance of an
interest in land and nothing else, it would be possible to invoke the law relating
to . . . conveyances generally. If the lease could be classified as an executory contract and nothing else, it would be possible to invoke the law relating to . . . executory contracts.”).
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turn them into money.28 They need someone who has the expertise and resources to extract the minerals;29 the expert, in
turn, needs a financial incentive to put his expertise to work.
Enter our oil extractor (whom we will later call a lessee).30
The extractor can get the oil and wants to make a profit from
getting it. Extracting the oil is a specialized task that involves significant initial investment and risk-tolerant longterm investment. The extractor will have to find the oil, far
underground with heavy machinery. The extractor will then
have to maintain personnel and machinery equipped to extract and transfer the oil—if and when it is located.
There is a match to be made here. The owner has oil that
can be turned into money. The extractor says, “Hey, I can do
that, but not for free.” The normal (and sensible) arrangement starts by the owner agreeing to pay the extractor by
letting the extractor have a portion of the oil if, and when, it
is located. But the nature of the relationship that is to be created is far more complex, because this is not a treasure hunt
performed with a shovel and ending with a quick retrieval of
a box. Instead, it will take significant time to get to the oil.
And the oil cannot be lifted to the surface all at once. It takes
time. And for the arrangement to be worth it for both parties,

28. Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of Oil
and Gas Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 674 (1994) (stating that landowners rarely
“have the technical or financial capability of conducting, or are willing to assume
the risk of, such operations”).
29. John S. Lowe, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND
TAXATION 1-1, 1-19 (Carol J. Holgren ed., 1988) (“[T]he lease transaction occurs
because the owner of the mineral rights generally lacks the expertise and capital
to develop them, and so transfers them to an oil company, which impliedly or
expressly represents that it possesses the talent and the money to develop
them.”).
30. For simplicity, we will treat the lessee as the extractor. Although various
arrangements may exist whereby the lessee may contract out various aspects of
the extraction, those arrangements introduce verbiage and complexities irrelevant to this discussion. See Erica Levine Powers & Adam J. Yagelski, The Oil and
Gas Industry: Operations and Best Practices, in BEYOND THE FRACKING WARS: A
GUIDE FOR LAWYERS, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PLANNERS, AND CITIZENS 19, 24 (Erica Levine Powers & Beth E. Kinne eds., 2013) (“The process of drilling a well can involve
a complex relationship between an operator, OFS companies, and companies involved the midstream sector.”).
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that oil must be located and its stream of revenue extended
for quite some time.
So the owner looks across the fields, roads, cattle, and
whatever else makes the surface estate personal to the
owner. And the owner needs to choose a partner to drill into
this surface and to set up a continuing presence on the
owner’s property. Many terms and aspects of the relationship
must be determined. Obviously, she must determine how, legally, they will give the extractor some of the minerals that
belong to the owner. Given that the quantity of oil will never
be known, she must decide how long the relationship will
last. When will it end? How will the owner be paid? How will
the owner know how much payment she is entitled to, given
that the owner likely has no expertise in measuring oil quantities or other matters that would be required for an accounting? How much will extracting the minerals disrupt the surface estate?
The resulting relationship, however structured, will be
enduring, dependent upon trust, and intimate in the sense of
the extractor being an extended guest on the owner’s property. The owner wants money, but likely not at all costs. As
with any other cost-benefit equation, the owner’s analysis
will likely have limits as to when the costs of the extraction
outweigh the benefits of the monthly check. Perhaps the
owner is willing to enter into this relationship if the owner
can trust the lessee to account accurately, to not unnecessarily disrupt the surface estate, to drive sensibly on the
roads while the grandkids are playing, and to shut the gates
so the cattle do not escape. On the other hand, most owners
would not accept a monthly royalty check from a shady character they cannot trust to divvy up fairly and who will likely
show insufficient attention to the disruption of activities on
the surface.
The considerations of the extractor are almost entirely
economic. This is not a bad thing—given the typical sharethe-oil payment approach, the owner obviously benefits from
the extractor wanting to produce sufficiently and efficiently.
To the extractor, the intangibles of the surface estate are (understandably) merely a burden on efficiently extracting the
minerals. Most extractors likely feel little sentiment about
“ol’ Catfish Pond.” But they may have to accommodate that
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pond or other owner requests, for the owner can decide that
partnering with the extractor is just not worth it.
The parties could reach various arrangements. The
owner could sell everything to the extractor, surface and minerals. The owner could sell the minerals to the extractor for a
set price and be done with the minerals forever. Under either
of these two arrangements, the extractor has assumed the
inherent risks involved in mineral production: by purchasing
the minerals, the extractor suffers the financial loss when a
dry hole is drilled and the financial boon when a gusher is
hit. The landowner, on the other hand, has insulated against
these very risks by selling the minerals: she is no longer financially interested in the success of the drilling operators,
because she has received her payment upfront.
The more typical arrangement—and the one with which
this Article is concerned—is when the landowner forgoes an
outright sale of the minerals in favor of a lease of the minerals. The incidents of this lease relationship are explored more
directly below. As an initial matter, however, it is worth noting that a lease allocates the risk of mineral production differently than what occurs in an outright sale. If the extractor
drills a dry hole, the landowner is not paid (or is paid a minimal amount). If the extractor hits a gusher, the landowner
is paid handsomely. With a lease, the landowner’s financial
success depends on the success of the extractor. In a practical
(but not a legal) sense, then, a lease creates a partnership
between the landowner and extractor.
Under a lease, the owner has given up the owner’s right
to certain minerals that are extracted. But the owner still
owns the surface.31 The owner still has (in a non-legal sense)
an interest in the minerals extracted because the owner will
be paid from them. And the owner still has the right, in the
future, to own the surface and minerals entirely again—once
the lease ends. In the meantime, the owner’s present inci-

31. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 1, § 1.3 (“When the mineral estate has been
‘severed,’ the remaining aggregate of rights in the land has become generically
termed as the ‘surface’ [estate].”).

2016]

OIL AND GAS LEASE RESTRAINTS

317

dents of ownership must yield in order to effectuate the profitable removal of the minerals, lest both parties’ expectations
be thwarted.
In a legal sense, then, the owner maintains fee ownership
of the surface estate, but must grant32 certain permissions to
use her property to effectuate the extraction. The owner does
not sell the minerals absolutely; rather, the owner gives the
extractor the right to extract the minerals for a certain period
(often indefinitely), but then maintains a future interest in
the mineral estate. And the details of the arrangement (Who
pays whom? When? For how long? What about accountings?
What are the restrictions on surface disruption?) will be governed by promises the parties make to each other. So long as
this entire arrangement is worth it to the owner (who is considering all aspects of the arrangement) and sufficiently profitable for the extractor, the parties then partner up, using
what is known as an oil and gas lease.33
III. APPLYING ALIENABILITY LAW TO OIL AND GAS LEASES
To determine the legality of alienation restraints in an
oil and gas lease, it is not sufficient to understand the relationship between landowner and extractor (addressed in the
previous Part); it is also necessary to have a basic understanding of the body of law that determines what restraints
are enforceable and what restraints are illegal. In a separate
article, we provide a more theoretical account of this body of

32. Even if the right to use the surface is not expressly granted to the extractor,
this right is implied by the courts. See Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex.
1943) (explaining the implied reservation to use the surface estate is necessary
because “a grant or reservation of minerals would be wholly worthless if the
grantee or reserver could not enter upon the land in order to explore for and extract the minerals granted . . .”); Bret Wells, The Dominant Mineral Estate in the
Horizontal Well Context: Time to Extend Moser Horizontally, 53 HOUS. L. REV.
193 (2015).
33. For the remainder of this Article, and for ease of communication, we will
employ the popular term “lease” to describe this relationship. As urged in Part I,
however, the ultimate question addressed in this Article should not be resolved
by resort to this convenient label.
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law.34 For present purposes, it is sufficient to discuss only the
basic characteristics of this body of law.35
First, it is important to recognize that restraints on property interests36 are sometimes upheld and sometimes invalidated. Despite the mantra in favor of the “free alienability of
property” that is frequently recited in hornbooks,37 casebooks,38 and (occasionally) case opinions,39 many types of privately-imposed restraints on alienability are upheld and enforced. Indeed, the most recent Restatement suggests that
only “unreasonable” restraints should be invalidated.40 This

34. See generally Luke Meier & Rory Ryan, Aggregate Alienability, 60 VILL.
L. REV. 1013 (2015).
35. A more thorough and detailed discussion of this law, and its underlying
rationales, can be found in our Aggregate Alienability article. See id.
36. As mentioned previously, if no “property” interest is being conveyed, the
relationship is controlled by contract law. The black-letter law discussed in this
Part addresses “property” law. However, as explained in the text, the division
between “property” and “contract” is often fuzzy, and the legality of restraints on
property interests often considers how “contractual” the relationship between
grantor and grantee is. See supra intro.
37. See, e.g., CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 42 (3d ed. 2002) (“[T]here is a very strong policy favoring the free and unfettered alienability of land.”).
THE

38. See, e.g., JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 184 (1998) (“Not surprisingly, given the
struggle for free alienability of land, the common law developed a separate doctrine preventing ‘direct’ restraints on alienability.”); THOMAS W. MERRILL &
HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 607 (2007) (“[O]ne of the
normal incidents of owner sovereignty is transferability, and . . . courts consequently take a dim view of attempts to restrain the power of an owner to alienate.
Thus, any attempt directly to restrain alienation will be held void as contrary to
public policy.”).
39. See, e.g., Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379, 381
(N.Y. 1986) (“Their purpose is to ensure the productive use and development of
property by its current beneficial owners by simplifying ownership, facilitating
exchange and freeing property from unknown or embarrassing impediments to
alienability.”) (emphasis added); Box L Corp. v. Teton Cty., 92 P.3d 811, 815
(Wyo. 2004) (“[T]he law favors the free alienability of property interests.”) (emphasis added).
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (“A prohibition on transfer of property without the consent of another is an
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mixed body of law (sometimes enforcing restraints and sometimes invalidating them) reflects the complexity of the issue.
Although the common law prefers that property remain
freely alienable,41 the common law also assumes that parties
should generally be able to dispose of their property as they
wish.42 When a grantor conveys Blackacre to a grantee but
limits the grantee’s ability to alienate Blackacre, these two
fundamental concepts are in tension.43 If the restraint is invalidated, the property remains freely alienable, but the
grantor’s right to dispose of his property according to his
wishes is impaired. If, however, the restraint is upheld and
enforced, the grantor’s right to dispose of his property as he
sees fit is respected, but at the cost of impairing the future
alienability of the property.
This fundamental tension has resulted in a complex body
of law that sometimes upholds the restraint on alienability
and sometimes invalidates it. Thus, the resolution in any particular case will probably depend upon a variety of factors.
The most important of these factors involve: (1) the type of
transaction between grantor and grantee in which the re-

unreasonable restraint on alienation unless there is a strong justification for the
prohibition . . . .”).
41. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 38, at 532 (“The law has long favored transferability of property.”); A. W. B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF
THE LAND LAW 224 (1961) (stating that the common law has attempted to preserve
property alienability); Andrea J. Boyack, Community Covenant Alienation Restraints and the Hazard of Unbounded Servitudes, 42 REAL EST. L.J. 450, 452
(2014) (“Traditionally, the law has jealously guarded the right to transfer real
property, striking down deed alienation restraints . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 102 n.3 (8th ed. 2014) (describing the “right to transfer” as one of the sticks in the bundle of property
rights).
43. See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 38, at 532 (“This rule [against restraints on alienation], of course, limits the freedom of the original owner to transfer: The original owner is barred from engaging in a transfer that limits further
transfers.”); see also EDWARD H. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW
257 (6th ed. 2011) (describing the tension between the proposition that a property
owner should be able to sell his property as he sees fit with the notion that a
property owner should be bound by a commitment not to refrain from selling the
property).
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straint is imposed (commercial transaction or probate conveyance); (2) the type of estate on which the restraint is imposed (fee simple, lease, etc.); and (3) the type of restraint
involved (disabling or forfeiture).
In some instances, these factors have been reduced to
common law “rules.” Thus, for instance, a restraint imposed
within a lease is generally enforceable,44 while a restraint imposed upon a fee simple is generally not.45 As implored in Part
I, however, it is imperative to resist the temptation to resolve
the legality of restraints in an oil and gas lease by a simple
resort to labels.46 Rather, it is important to understand why
a restraint on a lease is often upheld and why a restraint on
a fee simple is usually invalidated. Understanding the reasons for these “rules” is the key to applying them to a restraint imposed within the context of an oil and gas lease.
A. An Oil and Gas Lease is an Inter Vivos, Commercial
Transaction
The common law regarding the validity of alienation restraints makes a distinction between restraints imposed
within a donative transfer and those imposed within a nondonative transfer.47 A donative transfer is a transfer in which
44. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. REV.
751, 755 (1988) (“Historically, the common law courts, preferring form over function (as in much of property law), have not viewed the lease as a freehold estate,
and have allowed absolute restrictions on the alienability of a lease.”).
45. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 567 n.76 (stating the presumption).
46. In any event, these “rules” are overly broad and often contradictory. For
instance, while one can find many cases invoking the “rule” that a restraint within
a lease is valid, there are just as many cases reciting the rule that a disabling
restraint is invalid. Compare Deviney v. Nationsbank, 993 S.W.2d 443, 452 (Tex.
App. 1999) (one of many cases) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 4.1 statutory note (AM. LAW INST. 1983) (listing various “rules”).
What, then, of a disabling restraint imposed upon a lease? Obviously, the various
“rules” that are sometimes pronounced by courts or commentators are often more
nuanced than what is suggested.
47. Both the Restatement (Second) of Property and the Restatement (Third) of
Property address “donative transfers” as a separate topic. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS intro. (AM. LAW INST.
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the grantor receives no consideration for the conveyance.48 A
large percentage of donative transfers are probate transfers,
meaning that the transfer occurs at the death of grantor; the
rest are gifts made during the life of the grantor. Non-donative transfers, then, involve instances in which the grantee
has paid consideration for the interest being transferred by
the grantor. Therefore, we will refer to non-donative transfers as “commercial”49 transfers.
Under the common law, a restraint imposed within a
donative transfer is much more likely to be invalidated than
a restraint imposed within a commercial transfer. 50 Stated
1999) (explaining why donative transfers were not treated as separate topic);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS intro. (AM. LAW INST.
1983) (same). The distinction between donative and non-donative transfers is also
drawn in the initial Restatement, albeit in a more subtle fashion. See
RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 410 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (distinguishing the validity of a restraint on alienation of a lease when the restraint is imposed as part
of a “business” transaction as opposed to another type of transaction such as a
donative transfer).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS intro. (AM. LAW
INST. 1983) (explaining the difference between donative and non-donative transfers).
49. By “commercial,” we simply intend to refer to any transaction that is not
donative. Thus, any transaction in which the grantee is paying the grantor for the
property interest being transferred is “commercial” for purposes of this Article.
Thus, even if the grantee is buying the property for purposes of residential use of
the property, the transaction is “commercial” in the sense that it is not donative.
50. The Restatement articulates this concept in a somewhat obtuse manner.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS intro. note (AM. LAW
INST. 1983) (“[T]he rules developed in this Part [concerning donative transfers],
to the extent that they permit restraints on alienation, are equally permissible in
regard to non-donative transfers.”). Despite the clumsiness of this language, however, the point that restraints on alienation are more likely to be valid in nondonative transfers is relatively clear. See, e.g., Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug. Co.,
884 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tex. App. 1994) (“In other words, if an alleged restraint on
alienation is valid under the Restatement provisions, it is valid whether the
transaction is donative or nondonative. The important implication of the quoted
passages, however, is that the Restatement was not intended to address unreasonable commercial restraints on alienation. That is, an alleged restraint on alienation could be invalid in a donative context, but nevertheless be valid in a
nondonative context.”) (emphasis in original); see also Restatement (SECOND) OF
PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §4.1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1983) (“To the extent that
a disabling restraint is found valid [in the context of a donative transfer], it should
likewise be found valid in a non-donative transfer.”); id. rep.’s note at 10 (“Recent
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conversely, a restraint imposed within the context of a commercial transaction is much more likely to be upheld than a
restraint imposed within a donative transfer.
Obviously, an oil and gas lease is not a donative transfer.
The landowner does not convey to the extractor out of good
will or pursuant to a donative spirit. Rather, the landowner
enters into an oil and gas lease in the hopes of achieving monetary profit;51 this, too, is the objective of the extractor. The
financial arrangement between the landowner and extractor
will usually include an upfront “bonus” at the commencement
of the lease and “rent” in the form of royalty payments once
successful production occurs.52
developments in cases concerned with commercial transfers of property indicate
that courts are increasingly willing to deal with disabling restraints on their individual merits rather than invalidating them wholesale, and will uphold such
restraints if they leave available a means of current transfer and if under all the
circumstances the legal policy favoring freedom of alienation does not reasonably
apply.”) (emphasis added). In addition, although the First and Third Restatements are less explicit than the Second Restatement in distinguishing between
donative and non-donative transfers in their respective discussions of restraints
on alienation, the analysis adopted in these Restatements nevertheless incorporates this distinction and confirms that the law is more permissive with regard to
restraints on alienability for non-donative transfers. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP.
§ 410 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (stating that a restraint imposed as part of a
“business transaction” is more likely to be valid as opposed to when the restraint
is imposed as part of a donative transfer); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (explaining that the validity of restraints imposed within a donative transfer is not separately addressed in the
Third Restatement “because they are extensively treated in [the Second Restatement]”); cf. id. § 3.5 cmt. b (explaining that indirect restraints on alienation are
more likely to be upheld when the restraints are imposed in a commercial transaction as opposed to a donative transfer).
51. As mentioned earlier, the landowner will often have other concerns that he
wants to protect when entering the oil and gas lease (such as protecting the surface of his land during extraction). See supra pp. 315-17. Our point here, though,
is that the reasons prompting a landowner to affirmatively enter into an oil and
gas lease are financial.
52. See 3A NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 30.1 (Thomson Reuters
3d ed. 2015) (explaining the cash bonus and royalty payments, as well as the delay
rentals that may be paid in some jurisdictions so as to extend the lease even
though actual drilling has not occurred). In some jurisdictions, royalty payments
are not just the practical equivalent of rent, but are legally treated as rent, see
generally O’Neal v. Union Producing Co., 153 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1946), thus entitling the landowner to cancellation of the lease when royalty payments are not
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Moreover, an oil and gas lease, unlike most donative
transfers, is not a probate transfer. The oil and gas lease is
an inter vivos transaction, meaning that the conveyance by
the landowner is made during the life of the landowner.
The inter vivos, commercial nature of the oil and gas
lease would seem to point in favor of the enforcement of an
alienation restraint within an oil and gas lease. These labels,
however, are not determinative; rather, it is necessary to consider why restraints are more likely to be upheld for inter
vivos, commercial transactions, and whether these reasons
apply to an oil and gas lease.
1. Commercial v. Donative Transactions
The favorable treatment afforded alienation restraints
imposed within a commercial transaction is related to the
dual nature of such a transaction. When property is purchased (rather than donated), the property act of conveying
the interest is part of a larger contractual relationship between the parties. Under this contractual relationship, the
grantor must convey the bargained-for property interest
while the grantee pays the bargained-for purchase price.
Because the property conveyance is part of a larger contractual agreement between the parties, it is natural that
any restraint on alienation be considered from a contractual
perspective as well as a property perspective. And viewing
the relationship from a contractual perspective strongly favors the alienation restraint.
Contract doctrine generally holds that parties should be
held to the bargain that they negotiate;53 this assumption applies to restrictions within a contract against alienating the
properly made. See generally Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165
(5th Cir. 1970) (discussing the termination of a lease due to missed royalty payments).
53. See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions,
41 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011) (“Modern contract law is designed to achieve a
fundamental objective, namely, to ensure that voluntary agreements between private parties are legally binding.”). Of course, when there is “unequal bargaining”
power between the parties, courts might refuse enforcement. See, e.g., Daniel D.
Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 144-53 (2005)
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subject matter of a contract.54 Moreover, when part of that
bargain is an alienation restraint, presumably the price that
was commanded by the grantor was conditioned on the
grantee’s acceptance of that clause.55 Allowing a grantee to
agree to such a provision, and then later escape enforcement
by arguing that the restriction is illegal, violates the basic
contract precept that parties be held to their bargain.
Thus, the more contractual the relationship between
grantor and grantee, the easier it is to view disputes between
these two parties from a contractual relationship. And this
contractual perspective weighs heavily in favor of enforcement of a privately-imposed restraint on alienability.
(explaining how inequalities in bargaining power factor into a variety of contract
defenses). Under many of the usual methods for determining bargaining power,
however, it is the oil and gas company—not the landowner—that would presumably have superior bargaining power. See Max Helveston & Michael Jacobs, The
Incoherent Role of Bargaining Power in Contract Law, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1017, 1028-29 (2014) (discussing how some courts assume that a corporation with
sophisticated knowledge of a subject matter will be presumed to have superior
bargaining power). Thus, the concept of inequality of bargaining power is not a
persuasive argument against enforcement of an alienation restraint. Rather, because enforcement would occur against the sophisticated oil and gas operator,
consideration of the relative bargaining power of the parties would seem to further compel enforcement of the parties’ bargain. See Ernest E. Smith, Joint Operating Agreement Jurisprudence, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 834, 839, 851 (1994) (stating
that an operator is “almost invariably in a superior bargaining position” and that
lessors might not have similar experience).
54. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (stating that contractual rights can usually be assigned, but acknowledging
that a contractual restraint can change this result); id. § 322 (discussing enforcement of restraints on assignments of contractual rights); id. § 322 cmt. a (“In the
absence of statute or other contrary public policy, the parties to a contract have
power to limit the rights created by their agreement. The policy against restraints
on the alienation of property has limited application to contractual rights.”). In
fact, there is a general presumption under contract law that personal duties under a contract cannot be delegated to a third party, even without a clause in the
contract prohibiting this type of delegation. See id. § 319 cmt. b (“[P]erformance
of personal services and the exercise of personal skill and discretion are not ordinarily delegable.”).
55. See, e.g., Alby v. Banc One Fin., 128 P.3d 81, 84 (Wash. 2006) (“However,
the Brashlers’ interest in free alienation is limited by the fact that they agreed to
the restraint in consideration for the substantially reduced price. . . . Both parties
also have legitimate interests in enforcing the terms of their contract.”).
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In a donative transfer, this contractual perspective is not
appropriate. A grantee who receives a property interest pursuant to a donative transfer has not given any consideration
for this interest. Thus, a donative transfer is 100% property
and 0% contract.56 The contractual argument in favor of enforcing the alienation restraint completely drops out of this
type of transaction.
An oil and gas lease, however, is a quintessential commercial transaction. The entire arrangement is designed to
secure economic profit for both the landowner and extractor.
And, as has already been discussed above (and as will be discussed, again, below), the conveyance of the landowner’s mineral interest is but a small part of the complex relationship
created between landowner and extractor.57 One look at a
standard oil and gas lease—sometimes running into dozens
of pages58—confirms the contractual nature of this “conveyance.” Thus, a contractual perspective seems particularly appropriate when thinking about the relationship created by an
oil and gas lease.59

56. For this reason, both gift law and the law applicable to probate transfers
are taught in law school “property” classes, not “contracts” classes. See, e.g., JERRY
L. ANDERSON & DANIEL B. BOGART, PROPERTY LAW: PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND
PERSPECTIVES 255-58 (2014) (providing an introduction to wills); ERIC T.
FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND
THE COMMON GOOD 696 (2012) (dealing with transfers of property upon death);
JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 208-30 (2d ed. 2012) (covering gifts of personal property).
57. See 2 SAINT-PAUL, supra note 52, § 13.2 (“And if the contract is viewed as a
whole, it is different from an ordinary conveyance of land or of oil and gas in place,
for it is these active duties of the lessee, created by express or implied covenants,
which makes the interest created different from an ordinary conveyance of land
or from the grant of a mineral fee in the oil and gas in place.”).
58. See KUNTZ, supra note 5, § 18.1 (“The modern oil and gas lease is a very
complex instrument which is the product of many years of rapid evolution. The
length, as well as the complexity of the instrument, has increased considerably
since the time of the first reported oil and gas lease.”).
59. Indeed, some jurisdictions tend to view an oil and gas lease solely through
a contract—rather than property—lens. See, e.g., Harris v. Ohio Oil Co.,
48 N.E. 502, 506 (Ohio 1897) (“The rights and remedies of the parties to an oil or
gas lease must be determined by the terms of the written instrument, and the law
applicable to one form of lease may not be, and generally is not, applicable to
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Under this contractual perspective, the case for enforcement of the parties’ bargain in an oil and gas lease is strong,
particularly considering that enforcement of an alienation restraint will work against an oil and gas extractor. One would
be hard-pressed to find a more sophisticated party than an
oil and gas extractor.60 Holding an oil and gas producer to the
express terms of the deal it negotiated with a landowner is
intuitive. Conversely, allowing a producer to escape enforcement of such a clause (after agreeing to such a clause when
signing the lease) is objectionable.61
Besides the fact that a commercial transaction facilitates
a contractual perspective of the relationship between the parties, a commercial transaction is also different than a donative transfer because the presence of a paying grantee ensures that society’s broader concern in keeping property
freely alienable is taken into account at the time the restraint
is imposed. In a commercial transaction, the grantee paying
for the property interest being conveyed is the same party
who will be impaired by any alienation restraint. Thus, a
grantee purchasing a property interest with an alienation restraint must determine whether the current transaction is
another and different form. Such leases are contracts, and the terms of the contract with the law applicable to such terms must govern the rights and remedies
of the parties.”); KUNTZ, supra note 5, § 22.4 (“In Kansas, an unproductive oil and
gas lease resembles an executory contract more than it does a conveyance of an
interest in land.”).
60. Cf. J. Zach Burt, Playing the “Wild Card” in the High-Stakes Game of Urban Drilling: Unconscionability in the Early Barnett Shale Gas Leases, 15 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 22 (2008) (“Because of the nature of the underlying business
deal, and considering how the most common oil and gas lease is structured, a
strong case for substantive unconscionability can already be made for early signers of Barnett Shale leases on these facts alone.”); R.K. Pezold & Danny P. Richey,
The “Industry Deal” Among Oil and Gas Companies and the Federal Securities
Acts, 16 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 827, 870 (1985) (“Certainly, there is no reason for a
sophisticated and experienced oil and gas company, which fails to bring that experience and sophistication to bear when considering whether to participate in
drilling activity promoted by another oil and gas company, should thereafter be
allowed to shield itself from its own folly and use the securities laws to rescind
the transaction.”).
61. This result is even more problematic if the extractor planned to ignore the
restraint and, if necessary, argue that the restraint was illegal in subsequent litigation.
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“worth it,” given that the grantee might later be impaired in
attempting to subsequently alienate the property. By nevertheless agreeing to purchase the interest (with the restraint
attached), the grantee presumably decides that a purchase of
the interest now is worth the later restriction on alienation.62
The grantee’s weighing process serves as a rough surrogate
for the wider policy interests at play.63
In a donative transfer, however, there is no analogous
weighing process by the grantee. Because the grantee is not
paying for the property interest, any impairment on the
grantee’s ability to subsequently alienate the property will
not change the grantee’s cost-benefit analysis; the grantee
has no costs in deciding to accept the property interest being
donated.
This weighing process will definitely occur when the commercial transaction involves an oil and gas lease. An extractor who agrees to a lease containing an alienation restraint
will almost surely analyze the benefits of buying the interest
now with the risks of being unable to later alienate the interest. As explained above, this weighing process ensures that
the costs of an alienation restraint are at least considered at
the time of the transaction creating the alienation restraint.
If anybody is likely to know the benefits of being able to freely
alienate the oil and gas interest, it is the extractor. The decision of the extractor to proceed with the purchase of the interest (with the alienation restraint) means that the extractor believes that the benefits of immediate alienability64 outweigh any future impairments on the ability of the extractor
to transfer to a third party.
62. Of course, the cost to a grantee purchasing an interest with an alienation
restraint must be discounted by the probability that a court will not enforce the
restraint (or that a landowner might waive the restraint).
63. See Meier & Ryan, supra note 34, at 1027 n.32.
64. These benefits are likely to be substantial, given that oil and gas production cannot usually commence unless a lease is signed. Here again, of course, an
extractor will have to discount the costs associated with purchasing a restrained
interest by the probability that a court (or the landowner) will later waive the
restraint. See supra text accompanying note 62. In many states (most notably,
Texas), because the law regarding the validity of alienation restraints in an oil
and gas lease has not been firmly resolved, there are additional costs associated
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2. Probate Transfers v. Inter Vivos Transfers
The large percentage of donative transfers that occur at
death also explains why alienation restraints within a donative transfer are more likely to be stricken.
The law is particularly restrictive of restraints made
within a probate transfer (through a will) because a probate
grantor (a “devisor”) must dispose of his property at death.
As the old adage goes, “you can’t take it with you.” The devisor has no choice but to dispose of his property; if he refuses
to do so through a will, it will pass by intestate succession to
his heirs or escheat to the state.65
Because a probate transfer will occur even if a desired
restraint is invalidated, the law is particularly likely to invalidate an alienation restraint in this context. By striking
the restraint, the property remains freely alienable in the future. This is a benefit to invalidating the restraint. With a
probate transfer, there is no cost to invalidating the restraint.
Probate grantors cannot decide to forego a transaction simply
because their desired restraint on alienability is likely to be
declared illegal; they have no choice but to go through with a
transfer of the property, even if some particular detail of the
transaction (restraining alienability) might not be enforceable.66 Death robs the grantor of any choice in the matter.
Thus, there is no “chilling effect” on probate transfers that
occurs from invalidating attempted alienation restraints.
With an inter vivos transaction, however, a grantor does
have the ability to refrain from a transaction if she knows
that her desired restraint on alienability will not be enforced
by the courts. This represents a cost of enforcing a restraint;
future grantors might decide to refrain from a transfer if they
know their restraint on later transactions will be rejected by
the courts.
with this legal uncertainty. In this sense, then, there are benefits to resolving the
issue which this Article addresses, regardless of the outcome reached by the
courts.
65. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 727 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“At
common law the property of a person who died intestate and without lawful heirs
would escheat to the sovereign . . . .”).
66. See Meier & Ryan, supra note 34, at 1026-27 n.30.
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A landowner contemplating an oil and gas lease is, obviously, a living grantor. The landowner is alive, and is free to
walk away if the arrangement is not on terms that are satisfactory to the landowner. A living landowner, unlike a probate donor, has this ability.
At first blush, it might seem far-fetched to suppose that
a landowner might actually refrain from entering into an oil
and gas lease if the landowner knows that he will have no
ability to control who is conducting extracting operations on
his land. Undoubtedly, there are some landowners who will
nevertheless agree to an oil and gas lease, even if that landowner knows that her desire to restrain subsequent alienation of the interest to third parties will not be enforced.
But for some landowners (and landlords), the inability to
control subsequent transfers of the exploration right will be
a deal-breaker.67 Here, it is important to consider the points
made in the previous Section regarding the various values
that will be important to a landowner in deciding whether—
and with whom—to enter a lease. The landowner depends on
the lessee to account accurately for profits, to sensibly share
possession of the surface, and to otherwise act as a reasonable partner with the landowner. Because of this, some landowners, at least, will require control over whom they are
partnering with.
The point here is not to resolve how frequently a landowner might make that decision. Rather, the important concepts are that (1) a landowner contemplating an oil and gas
lease is a living person, and thus has the option to refrain
from entering into an oil and gas lease, and (2) at least some
landowners will refuse to enter into an oil and gas lease if
they know the alienation restraint that they desire will not
be enforced by the courts. These concepts (along with the
points made above in Part III.A.1) explain why restraints on
non-donative transfers are more likely to be upheld, and
these concepts apply with full force to an oil and gas lease.

67. The authors have first-hand experience with landowners having this perspective.
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B. An Oil and Gas Lease Involves an On-Going, Personal
Relationship
The common law maintains a sharp distinction between
restraints imposed within a land lease and restraints imposed upon other types of property interests. In almost all
instances, a landlord’s restraint on a tenant’s ability to alienate the lease will be enforced by the courts.68 Moreover, in
some states, by operation of statutory law, a tenant is precluded from transferring a lease to a third party without the
landlord’s consent.69 Thus, even without an explicit clause in
a lease prohibiting the tenant’s transfer to a third party, the
law will sometimes impair the tenant’s ability to alienate the
lease.
The rationale supporting land-lease restraints applies to
a mineral lease. In fact, as explained below, these reasons
apply with even more force to an oil and gas lease than they
do to a land lease.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1, intro.
note (AM. LAW INST. 1989) (“Restraints on the alienation of tenants’ interest in the
landlord-tenant situation are widely used to give the landlord some additional
assurance that the tenant of his choice will stay on the land and perform the obligations of the lease. The validity of these restraints on the tenant is generally
recognized.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.2(2)
(AM. LAW. INST. 1983) (“A restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of the tenant’s interest in the leased property is valid . . . .”). It is common for
leases to include a restraint on a tenant’s right to alienate. See FREYFOGLE &
KARKKAINEN, supra note 56, at 586 (“[M]any leases, both residential and commercial, provide that a tenant may not sublease or assign with the express consent of
the landlord.”). That the tenant’s power to transfer the lease depends upon the
landlord’s consent does not alter the characterization of the restriction as an alienability restraint, because even a flat prohibition on alienation can be waived
(that is, consented to) by the grantor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. d (“A prohibition on transfer of property without the consent of another is an unreasonable restraint on alienation unless there is a strong
justification for the prohibition . . . .”).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977) (stating that a tenant is usually entitled to alienate his interest
(absent a lease restraint on alienability), but providing exceptions); see also Stein,
supra note 8, at 15 n.54 (listing states that preclude a tenant from alienating his
interest unless consent to the transfer is given by the landlord, even without a
lease provision requiring the landlord’s consent).
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A typical lease is unlike other transfers of possessory estates because it creates a continuing relationship between
the grantor (the landlord) and the grantee (the tenant).70 On
the tenant’s side is the continuing obligation to pay rent.
The continuing obligation to make periodic payments to the
landlord is different than the lump-sum, up-front payment
involved in the conveyance of non-leasehold estate. Moreover,
the tenant has the continuing duty to refrain from behavior
that is disruptive to the land and improvements,71 and in
some instances the tenant might need to take affirmative
steps to preserve the value of the land for the landlord.72 The

70. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1
(3d ed. 2000) (defining a lease relationship in terms of the continuing covenants
owed between landlord and tenant).
On this point, the argument made in this Section (that restraints in an oil and
gas lease should be enforced because an oil and gas lease involves an on-going
relationship) converges with an argument made in a previous Section (that restraints in an oil and gas lease should be enforced because the relationship is
commercial and thus best viewed from a contractual perspective). The on-going
relationship between landlord and tenant is best viewed through a contractual
perspective, because the conveyance of the lease interest by landlord to tenant is
but a small component of the transaction. That said, the argument made in this
Section is analytically distinct from that advanced in the previous Section. A lease
is a special type of commercial transaction in the sense that the contractual obligations between grantor and grantee are on-going for the life of the lease. Thus,
while the case for enforcement of an alienability restraint is strong for any commercial transaction, the case for enforcement in a commercial transaction involving a lease is particularly strong because the contractual obligations of the parties
are on-going. So, while the conveyance of a lease is part of a commercial transaction, and that factor alone is a reason to enforce the restraint (as discussed in Part
III.A.1), the point made here is that a lease is a unique commercial transaction in
that the respective obligations owed by the parties continue on throughout the
“life” of the lease.
71. John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV.
1209, 1212-20 (2007) (explaining how the law precludes a tenant from conduct
amounting to affirmative waste). Often, the lease will explicitly address a tenant’s
duty in this regard, but even without such a lease provision the duty is imposed
by the common law. See CALVIN MASSEY, PROPERTY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS,
AND CASES 348 (2012) (“Leases commonly contain provisions that prohibit the tenant from committing waste of the premises . . . . In the absence of such provisions,
though, tenants are still liable for waste that they may commit.”).
72. See generally Anthony J. Fejfar, Permissive Waste and the Warranty of
Habitability in Residential Tenancies, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2001) (considering
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landlord, for his part, also owes a variety of continuing obligations to the tenant under standard “landlord-tenant” law.73
The landlord, for instance, will usually be obligated to make
repairs to the premises such that the purpose of the lease can
be fulfilled.74
Often, both the landlord and tenant will attempt to define, in the lease, the respective duties of each party going
forward.75 This is why a lease is usually a longer, more involved document than is a deed for a non-leasehold estate.
With a deed, the grantor and grantee know that they will
each go their separate ways after closing.76 With a lease, however, the parties understand that there will be a continuing
relationship going forward, and clarity and understanding
regarding the nature of this relationship is sought at the outset.
Because of the on-going, personal nature of the landlordtenant relationship, the law allows surface landlords to preclude a tenant from substituting a new party into this rela-

when a tenant might be required to take affirmative steps to prevent “permissive
waste”).
73. See DANIEL B. BOGART & CAROL NECOLE BROWN, PROPERTY LAW: WHAT
MATTERS AND WHY 121-28 (2012) (explaining the historical shift resulting in more
duties owed tenants by landlords).
74. See Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 477 (2014) (“In
addition to these explicit and voluntary promises, there are implicit covenants
that courts or legislatures insert into all leases, regardless of the parties’ desires.
Many such legally created obligations impose on landlords assorted duties to
maintain. These include a duty to maintain the building’s common spaces in a
safe condition and to protect tenants’ premises from third parties’ illegal activities.”).
75. See id.
76. Of course, assuming that the grantor has given a warranty deed, a title
defect might unite the parties. See generally Charles B. Sheppard, Assurances of
Titles to Real Property Available in the United States: Is a Person Who Assures a
Quality of Title to Real Property Liable for a Defect in the Title Caused by Conduct
of the Assured?, 79 N.D. L. REV. 311, 313-26 (2003) (describing the title covenants
made in a general or special warranty deed). This lawsuit, however, is different
than the on-going (and non-litigious) relationship described in the text.
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tionship without the landlord’s approval, assuming the landlord has asserted a clause to this effect in the original lease.77
It is quite sensible for a landlord to want to control who he is
going to owe duties to (under landlord-tenant law) going forward, and who is going to owe him duties (specifically, the
duty to pay rent)78 going forward. Quite sensibly, then, the
law enforces alienation restraints in the land lease context.79
The same concerns accompany a mineral lease. Like with
a typical lease, there are multiple, continuing obligations involved; the signing of the lease is just the beginning of the
relationship that is being commenced. Solely with regard to
exploration and production, the on-going duties of the lessee
(some of them expressly provided for in the lease and some of
them implied), have been described as follows:
To fully state the duties of the lessee, to be performed previous to
the payment of all of the royalties which he may earn from the land,
the lease would contain an express covenant to drill a test or discovery well within a fixed time, a covenant, if oil and gas are found
in paying quantities, to drill a certain number of wells on the land
within a stated time; a covenant to protect the demised land from
drainage through wells on adjoining lands by drilling offset wells,
stating with particularity the time, place, and manner of drilling
such wells; and a covenant to market the product of the wells after
production.80

This on-going relationship between landowner and extractor is further complicated by the fact that the extractor’s
duties will be performed on the landowner’s surface estate. In
77. Because the reasons for precluding transfers are so strong, in some states
a lessee is prevented from transferring the lease by operation of law, that is, even
without a lease clause restraining alienation. See Joshua Stein, Assignment and
Subletting Restrictions in Leases and What They Mean in the Real World,
44 REAL PROP. TRUST & EST. J. 1, 20 n.54 (2009) (listing states).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 15.2 cmt. a
(AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“The landlord may have an understandable concern about
certain personal qualities of a tenant, particularly his reputation for meeting his
financial obligations.”).
79. See JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 274 (3d ed. 1989) (“The reasons for such restrictions [on alienability in
a lease] are fairly apparent.”).
80. 2 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 17.1 (3d ed. 2006).

334

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

a typical landlord-tenant relationship, possession of a particular piece of land is shared between the grantor and grantee
across time. Thus, for instance, the tenant has the possessory
rights to the residence on Blackacre for a particular time period, with the possessory rights to Blackacre reverting to the
landlord after the expiration of the lease. This type of “sharing” of Blackacre—across time—is complicated enough, and
requires that the parameters of this relationship be clearly
spelled out at the outset of the lease. An oil and gas lease
involves the same type of durational sharing of the mineral
estate. In addition, though, there is a concurrent sharing of
the surface estate. As explained in Part II, the landowner’s
valuable minerals can only be accessed through the surface
estate. Thus, the extractor must be able to use the surface to
remove the minerals;81 but the landowner retains ownership
of the surface, and likely has uses of the surface that he
would like to see accommodated, if possible.82
This concurrent sharing of the surface estate thus makes
the relationship between landowner and extractor even more
intricate and interwoven than the typical relationship between landlord and tenant. To analogize, in a mineral lease
it is as if the landowner has rented out only the basement of
her house while retaining possession of the ground floor;
moreover, the only way to access the basement is through the
front door on the ground floor, which means that the tenant
cannot even access the rented basement without using the
landlord’s front door and walking through the landlord’s
main floor to the stairs leading to the basement.
But there is more. One of the most important, on-going
obligations in a standard land lease is the obligation of the
tenant to pay rent. Because of the continuing rent obligation,
the landlord has a legitimate interest in restricting transfers
of the lease. Granted, a landlord always retains—theoretically, at least—the ability to pursue the original lessee if the
81. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND
COLLECTIVE GOVERNANCE 395 (2007) (“The mineral lessee’s rights are dominant
to the extent that the lessee needs to use the surface for mining purpose, at least
so long as the surface use is reasonably necessary.”).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
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rent is not timely paid to the landlord, even if that original
lessee has transferred the lease interest to a third party.83
Practically speaking, however, the landlord would much prefer that the party in possession timely pay the rent.84 The
landlord has an assortment of remedies that are available
against the possessing tenant that are not available against
a party who is legally obligated to the landlord but is not in
possession. For instance, the landlord can pursue a summary
eviction against a possessing tenant;85 a landlord might be
able to lock-out the possessing tenant.86
This same interest applies in the oil and gas context, but
it is much more acute. First, a landowner in an oil and gas
lease (unlike a typical landlord) might not always have direct
recourse against the original lessee after a transfer of the
lease.87 Second, the landowner must trust that the extractor
is accounting accurately and honestly. The amount of “rent”
the extractor owes the landowner will be determined by the
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 16.1 cmt. c
(AM. LAW INST. 1977) (making clear the continuing contractual liability of the original tenant absent a “release” or “novation”).
84. See Gregory M. Stein, Will Ticket Scalpers Meet the Same Fate as Spinal
Tap Drummers? The Sale and Resale of Concert and Sports Tickets, 42 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 28 (2014) (“Second, at least in the case of an assignment, the landlord
nearly always receives the periodic rent directly from the new occupant of the
property and is concerned about the particular occupant’s ability to pay. Even in
the case of a sublease, the primary tenant’s ability to pay her rent to the landlord
is likely to be impaired if she is not receiving the sublease rent from the subtenant.”). The landlord’s interest that the lease only be transferred to financially capable transferees can be generally viewed in terms of a practical interest in avoiding costly and time-consuming litigation.
85. See Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary
Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 137 (2000) (“A summary
proceeding for eviction exists in every state.”).
86. See Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, 29 YALE J.
1, 24 (2012) (describing the circumstances under which landlord self-help
is permitted in some jurisdictions).
ON REG.

87. It is common for the original lease to contain a “separate ownership” clause,
which is intended to “absolve the original lessee from any liability if an assignee
does not protect the leasehold from drainage, fails to pay royalty on production,
or otherwise breaches express or implied lease covenants.” ERNEST E. SMITH &
JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 5.4(C)(2) (Thomson Reuters 2014).

336

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

success of the exploration and drilling operations. The formula for calculating this “rent”—that is, royalty payments—
will be established in the initial agreement.88 The actual
amount that is paid, however, depends on how much oil is
extracted by the operator. The extractor—not the landowner—has access to the information that is necessary in determining the amount of royalty payments due the landowner.89 In a very real sense, then, the landowner must trust
that the extractor is honestly accounting to the landowner for
his share of the production. Because of the necessary degree
of trust placed in the extractor—and because of the opportunity of the extractor to take advantage of its superior access
to information and to cheat the landowner out of his share of
the proceeds90—it is quite sensible that a landowner be allowed to control transfers of the mineral interest.
Trust, however, is not the only component of the landowner-extractor relationship that affects the “rent” that is
due the landowner. The skill of the extractor is also paramount. The amount that the landowner will be paid in royalties depends on the ability of an extractor to find oil and to
bring it to the surface.91 In a practical sense, then, the land-

88. See Bruce M. Kramer, Interpreting the Royalty Obligation by Looking at
the Express Language: What a Novel Idea?, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 223, 224-33
(2004) (discussing the different types of royalty interests in current use and the
history of these clauses).
89. See Ernest Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by An Operator To Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest Owners, in 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
12-1, 12-10 to -11 (1986) (stating that an operator has a fiduciary duty to account
to the landowner that is typical of the duty placed on those with an obligation to
“account for money or property received”).
90. Cf. SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 87, § 4.6(E) (“Disputes between royalty
owners and producers have existed since the early days of the oil and gas industries.”).
91. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, § 601 (explaining the landowner’s financial interest in quick exploration and production); Douglas R. Johnson, The Cooperative Venture: Revisiting the Relationship Between the Royalty and Working Interest in Texas, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 253, 253 (1999) (“If there is a large
amount of oil or gas produced on the lease, the landowner will receive a large
royalty; if there is a small amount of production, the royalty will be proportionally

2016]

OIL AND GAS LEASE RESTRAINTS

337

owner and extractor have entered into a joint venture or partnership in which the financial success to both parties depends on the skill of the extractor.92 And, of course, some extractors are more skilled than are others. Both Peyton Manning and Brian Hoyer are professional quarterbacks, and
both throw footballs to receivers. Manning, however, does it
much more successfully than does Hoyer. The Denver Broncos would not feel satisfied if Manning transferred his passthrowing obligations to Hoyer. Similarly, a landowner who
has entered into an agreement with an extractor, in which
the extractor’s skill in locating and extracting minerals is a
basis of the agreement, will want to be able to preclude the
extractor from transferring this interest to a less-skilled
party. It seems natural that the law would permit the landowner to prevent this type of transfer.
C. The Finite Nature of Oil and Gas Resources Necessarily
Limits the Duration of a Restraint
In the previous Section, the favorable treatment afforded
alienation restraints in leases was explained in terms of the
personal, and on-going, relationship between landlord and
tenant. There is another principle—a broader one—that also
explains why alienation restraints within leases are treated
favorably: leases will usually last for a shorter time period
than other possessory estates, particularly fee simple absolute estates.
The black-letter law holds that alienation restraints imposed upon shorter interests are much more likely to be permissible and enforced than restraints imposed upon longer

smaller.”). Indeed, cases have recognized that there is an implied covenant obligation for an extractor to use new technology when doing so maximizes production. See SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 90, § 5.4(C)(2).
92. This “partnership” is also evidenced by the fact that the landowner might
lose his interest in the mineral estate if the producer delays production and the
minerals are captured by a competitor. See generally Bruce M. Kramer & Owen
L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899
(2005) (discussing the historical development and the modern application of the
rule of capture).
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possessory estates.93 Thus, for example, a restraint imposed
upon a fee simple absolute estate is much more likely to be
invalidated than a restraint upon a life estate.94
The reason for this distinction within the black-letter law
is simple: a restraint upon a longer estate means that the restriction on subsequent transfers of the interest remains in
place for a much longer time period. Thus, a restraint on the
alienability of a fee simple absolute—if it were enforceable—
would mean that the property would forever be precluded
from transfer.95 When an alienation restraint is imposed
upon a shorter interest, however, enforcement of the restraint would mean only a limited temporal restriction on
transfer of the property.
The law’s more favorable treatment of restraints on
“shorter” estates (such as a life estate) works in favor of the
enforcement of alienation restraints on an oil and gas lease.
Under a standard oil and gas lease, the interest given to an
extractor by a landowner usually extends so long as production can occur in “paying quantities.”96 From a strictly theo-

93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (“Generally, greater restraints are justified on estates of lesser duration
than on estates of longer duration . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1983) (permitting forfeiture restraints
on a life estate but invalidating them on a fee simple estate); RESTATEMENT OF
PROP. §§ 406, 409-10 (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (imposing a more lenient approach to
the validity of restraints on alienation of a life estate and term of years than restraints on alienation of a fee simple).
94. DWYER & MENELL, supra note 38, at 185 (stating that restraints on a fee
are usually invalid, that restraints on a life estate may be valid, and that restraints on “lesser interests” are usually valid).
95. Of course, some method of transfer at the death of the holder of the interest
must occur. See Ryan & Meier, supra note 34, at 1033-34.
96. Most modern oil and gas leases involve a primary term of one to ten years,
under which the lessor can extend the lease, other than by production, through
the payment of delay rentals. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 1, § 6.2 (explaining the
use and history of delay rentals during the primary term). After this primary
term, however, the lease continues only so long as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, § 601.4 (“The habendum
clause of virtually all contemporary leases provides for a short primary term of
from one to ten years and provide that the lease may be preserved beyond the
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retical standpoint, of course, this could be of infinite duration.97 From a practical standpoint, however, the limited
quantity of minerals owned by any particular landowner necessarily limits the duration of an oil and gas lease. Even the
most productive wells eventually dry up. When this occurs,
the extractor’s interest extinguishes.
The limited duration of an oil and gas lease should not be
obscured by the “fee simple” label that some jurisdictions use
to describe an oil and gas lease.98 The fee simple term is used
only because the duration of a standard oil and gas lease—
for so long as production occurs in paying quantities—does
not correlate to the duration of any of the three types of leases
recognized under the common law.99 The use of term “fee simple” to describe the duration of an extractor’s interest evokes
expiration of the primary term ‘so long thereafter’ as oil or gas (or other specified
minerals) is produced in paying quantities.”).
97. For this reason, some jurisdictions apply the “fee simple” label to a lease.
See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2, § 207.
98. See id. (“[T]he deed-lease distinction is of little value in determining legal
consequences . . . .”).
99. It is the absence of a definite ending date in the lease, coupled with the fact
that a landowner cannot cancel an existing lease, which compels the conclusion
that, under the formal estates system within the common law of property, an oil
and gas “lease” is not a leasehold estate but is instead a fee simple defeasible.
Under the common law of property, three types of “non-freehold” lease estates are
recognized: a term of years, a periodic tenancy, and a tenancy at will. A term of
years is an estate with a fixed, ascertainable date. (“Lease to last until December
31, 2016.”) An oil and gas lease cannot be a term of years because it does not last
until a fixed, ascertainable date. A periodic tenancy is a lease that extends for
consecutive periods (week-to-week, month-to-month, year-to-year, etc.) until either landlord or tenant gives an adequate notice of termination, which is done if
notice equal to the period is given. The modern oil and gas lease cannot be considered a periodic tenancy; no period is defined in the lease. A tenancy at will is
a lease that lasts only so long as either party desires the lease to continue. An oil
and gas lease cannot be a tenancy at will, because the landowner is not free to
cancel the lease so long as the extractor is producing in paying quantities. See
generally JAMES CHARLES SMITH, THE GLANNON GUIDE TO PROPERTY 179-89 (3d ed.
2015) (describing the characteristics of a term of years, periodic tenancy, and tenancy at will).
Thus, from a duration perspective, none of the common law leasehold estates “fit”
the duration of the modern oil and gas lease. In deference to the numerous clausus
principle, which precludes courts from recognizing new property estates, a court
that is committed to fitting the oil and gas lease into the common law estates
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the image of a lasting estate extending for generations. The
reality, however, is that a modern oil and gas lease is of a
necessarily-limited duration. This reality—rather than the
“fee simple” label100—is relevant in determining the validity
of a restraint on alienation in an oil and gas lease.
D. An Extractor Can Surrender Its Interest Back to the
Landowner
The black-letter law regarding the validity of alienation
restraints can depend upon the type of restraint involved.101
Here, again, understanding the reason that this distinction
system must conclude that the extractor’s interest is a fee simple defeasible rather than a leasehold estate. Only by characterizing the estate as a fee simple
defeasible can a court recognize the ending date of the estate is the cessation of
production in paying quantities rather than a fixed ascertainable date, the ending
of a period, or the simple giving of notice by one party to the other.
100. It is worth noting that those jurisdictions that apply the “fee simple” label
to an oil and gas lease acknowledge that it is a defeasible—rather than absolute—
fee. And the usual rule that restraints on a fee simple absolute are usually invalid
does not apply to a fee simple defeasible. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 407
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (explaining—in a somewhat obtuse manner—that a
restraint on alienability for a fee simple defeasible is more likely to be reasonable,
and thus valid, than is an identical restraint on a fee simple absolute); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(“Generally, greater restraints are justified on estates of lesser duration than on
estates of longer duration . . . .”). We reject this sort of mechanical analysis in determining the validity of an alienation restraint in an oil and gas lease, but the
distinctions we have developed in this Section between long and short estates is
represented by the divergent treatment of alienation restraints for fee simple absolutes versus fee simple defeasibles.
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 3.1–.3 (AM.
LAW INST. 1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 404 (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (making the
distinction between disabling, forfeiture, and promissory restraints); ROGER
BERNHARDT & ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 92 (6th ed. 2010)
(“The legal effectiveness of [an alienation restraint] generally depends upon what
type of restraint it is.”). The Third Restatement eschews this distinction in favor
of an all-encompassing balancing test of “reasonableness.” See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). Courts, however, continue to distinguish between disabling, forfeiture, and promissory restraints
when determining the validity of an alienability restraint. See, e.g., Vande Guchte
v. Kort, 703 N.W.2d 611, 620-21 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (both recognizing this distinction in the context of determining the validity of an ability restraint); Alby v.
Banc One Fin., 128 P.3d 81, 87 (Wash. 2006) (Chambers, J., dissenting).
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is made within the common law furthers the conclusion that
a restraint within an oil and gas lease should be enforced,
even if it ostensibly resembles a disabling restraint.
There are basically three different types of alienation restraints. A disabling restraint is a restraint that purports to
flatly prohibit or invalidate any subsequent transfer of the
property.102 A forfeiture restraint also restricts alienability
but provides for a different remedy in the event of alienation;
the interest is forfeited to either the original grantor (the person imposing the forfeiture restraint) or a third party.103 A
promissory restraint is conceptually different than the other
two restraints in that its analytical foundations are rooted in
contract law rather than property law. Under a promissory
restraint, the grantee makes a promise that alienation will
not occur.104 If this promise is broken, the promisor-grantee is
liable in contract damages to the promisee-grantor, but the
transaction in violation of the promise is not affected.105

102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 (AM. LAW
INST. 1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 404 (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (defining a disabling restraint).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 (AM. LAW
INST. 1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 404 (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (defining a forfeiture restraint). If the interest terminates in favor of the grantor, and assuming
the forfeiture restraint is valid, the grantee has an interest that is either determinable or subject to a condition subsequent. If the interest terminates in favor
of a third party, and assuming the forfeiture restraint is valid, the grantee has an
interest that is subject to an executory limitation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1983) (using the word
“special limitation” instead of determinable, but stating the concept).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM. LAW
INST. 1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 404 (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (defining a promissory restraint).
105. This straightforward conclusion is muddled somewhat by the fact that contractual remedies can sometimes include specific performance in equity, and that
courts have occasionally enforced promissory restraints by an injunction precluding the promisor from alienating the property. When this occurs, a promissory
restraint functions in a manner similar to a disabling restraint. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1983) (explaining that specific performance might be used to enforce a promissory restraint
and the similarity in effect to a disabling restraint).
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Both forfeiture and promissory restraints are much more
likely to be enforced than is a disabling restraint.106 In fact,
disabling restraints are usually stricken, and one can find
numerous cases stating this purported “rule.”107
The reason that disabling restraints are usually invalidated is because of the dramatic affect a disabling restraint
has on the general goal of free alienability. With a disabling
restraint, the party who holds the restrained interest is flatly
precluded from transferring the interest. The power of alienation has been withheld from the party; this “stick” in the
property bundle of rights was never conveyed to the restrained party. This means that the restrained party is
“stuck” with that interest; even if the party wishes to rid itself
of that interest, there is no mechanism by which the party
can achieve this objective.108

106. The First Restatement is unequivocal in invalidating disabling restraints,
while the Second Restatement is (slightly) more tolerant. See RESTATEMENT OF
PROP. § 406(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1943) (stating that an alienability restraint is only
valid if it is a forfeiture or promissory restraint); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1983) (stating that a disabling
restraint is invalid if, by its terms, it makes alienation impossible, but providing
that disabling restraints that provide a process whereby alienation is possible
(such as receiving the consent of a third party) can be valid in some circumstances); id. §§ 4.2–.3 (providing a balancing test for determining the validity of
a forfeiture or promissory restraint).
107. See, e.g., TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Coupon Exch., Inc., 913 F.2d 676,
685 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The common law of property categorically condemns any
disabling restraint . . . .”).
108. When the grantee has no power to alienate, the interest held by the grantee
passes to his or her heirs upon the grantee’s death (assuming that the interest
does not extinguish upon the grantee’s death, such as with a life estate). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 3.1 illus. 1 (AM. LAW
INST. 1983) (implying that even the most “comprehensive as possible” alienability
restraint must allow for transfer by intestate succession). The interest received
by the heirs would still be impaired by the disabling restraint against alienation
if the law did not invalidate this type of restraint. A disabling restraint, then,
“freezes” alienation for the duration of the estate.
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With a forfeiture or promissory restraint, however, there
is some mechanism by which the restrained party can rid itself of the interest.109 With a promissory restraint, the restrained party can transfer the interest but must pay contractual damages to the original grantor (promissee), to
whom the promise not to alienate was made. With a forfeiture restraint, the restrained party can attempt to alienate
the interest, with the result of that interest being forfeited,
usually back to the original grantor. Thus, with either a
promissory or forfeiture restraint, there is some mechanism
by which the restrained party can rid itself of the unwanted
interest. As such, there is not an absolute prohibition on
transfer, but rather only a partial restraint on transfer; the
particular parties to whom a transfer is made—and the consequences for doing so—are controlled by the initial forfeiture or promissory restraint, but a transfer of the interest is
nevertheless possible.
The reasons that disabling restraints are usually invalidated does not apply to a restraint in an oil and gas lease,
even if that restraint has been drafted as a disabling restraint. No restraint that is imposed on an extractor’s mineral interest will ever function like a disabling restraint, such
that the extractor is “stuck” with an unwanted interest. The
extractor will always be able to surrender this interest back
to the landowner. In almost all oil and gas leases, the extractor will have explicitly reserved the right to surrender the
lease through a surrender clause.110
These explicit surrender clauses, however, only confirm
the more basic truth that a court will almost always refuse to
require a party to affirmatively perform duties to another
party.111 Recall that the agreement between landowner and
109. See Real Property—Direct Disabling Restraints on Alienation Annexed to
Legal Life Estates, 41 TENN. L. REV. 364, 365 (1974) (“[Forfeiture and promissory
restraints] fare quite well in the courts and are most often upheld, since they do
not substantially impair aliena[bility].”).
110. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 1, § 7.9 (“Virtually all modern oil and gas lease
forms contain a form of clause allowing the lessee to surrender the lease, or parts
thereof.”).
111. The practical difficulties associated with this type of remedy were nicely
captured by Professor Dan Dobbs: “How do you make an opera singer sing her
best? You don’t.” See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 2.5,
12.2 (1973).
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extractor is contractual in nature. The relationship between
the parties does not end with the “conveyance” of the mineral
interest from landowner to extractor. In reality, the relationship between these two parties is merely beginning at the
time the mineral interest is conveyed to the extractor. Both
parties, but particularly the extractor, have continuing obligations to one another under the relationship that is forged
under the agreement. This type of relationship—like that of
a landlord and tenant—is as much (if not more) a contractual
relationship than it is a property relationship. The contractual nature of the relationship underscores the remedies that
are available against a party who breaches a duty under the
agreement. Under contract law, damages—rather than specific performance—is the normal sanction imposed on a party
who breaks a promise.112
The reluctance of courts to remedy broken promises by
specific performance means that an extractor who wants out
of a lease can always achieve this result simply by breaking
the promises the extractor made under the lease.113 In other
words, if an extractor truly wants to rid himself of the extraction right, all that needs to be done is to stop exploring or
producing. The landowner will be entitled to any damages
that he incurs because of the extractor’s broken promise. But
the extractor will not be forced, by court order, to continue to
perform the duties associated with the mineral interest. Unlike what occurs with a disabling restraint,114 an extractor
112. See 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 162 (3d ed. 2004)
(stating this basic proposition).
113. This concept should not be confused with the situation in which an extractor wants to retain the working interest of a lease while refraining from recovery
operations. In this situation, a court might consider specific performance, but only
under the assumption that failure to specifically perform will result in a forfeiture
of the lease rather than contempt of court. See, e.g., Fort Worth Nat’l Bank v.
McLean, 245 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 1951) (considering whether to issue
an order requiring exploration activities to avoid cancellation of a lease). Our
point in this Section is that specific performance will never be ordered as a remedy
for the operator who wants to repudiate an oil and gas lease and forfeit the interest therein; specific performance might, however, be ordered as an inducement to
a party to perform a contract and avoid a subsequent forfeiture.
114. Although we conclude that disabling restraints in an oil and gas lease
should be enforced, this conclusion should be distinguished from the advice we
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who no longer wants the extraction interest will be able to
achieve this result by simply walking away from the lease.115
In this sense, then, enforcing a restraint on alienability will
never produce the unfortunate situation in which a party is
saddled with an unwanted interest.
IV. MINERAL OWNERS WHO DESIRE FULL ALIENABILITY
RIGHTS CAN SECURE THEM IN THE LEASE
The reaction of the oil and gas industry to the arguments
made in this Article can be easily predicted. Enforcing privately-imposed restraints on alienation, they will claim, will
dramatically impair the functioning of the oil and gas markets. This argument, however, is erroneous.
First, we want to stress that we do not discount the importance of free alienability to the oil and gas industry. Undoubtedly, it is often convenient and efficient for these interests to be alienated from one firm to the other.116 Particularly
with regard to the dramatic fluctuations in oil and gas
prices,117 transfers of working interests under a lease might
would give to landowners negotiating an oil and gas lease. We would never advise
a landowner client to include a disabling restraint in an oil and gas lease. To the
extent that a landowner intends to restrict the extractor’s ability to alienate, he
or she should draft the clause so as to provide for forfeiture in the event that the
lessee alienates. Doing so strengthens the argument that the clause is valid and
enforceable. Moreover, even if a disabling restraint is determined to be valid,
some difficult issues arise in suits to enforce the clause, particularly when that
suit is initiated by the original grantor in the transaction in which the disabling
restraint was imposed. See Meier & Ryan, supra note 34, at 1036.
115. It is true that specific performance is sometimes ordered for contracts involving the conveyance of land, on the view that land is unique. But this general
principle would not justify a court order requiring an extractor to commence or
continue with extraction activities. The extractor’s duties involve services rendered on the land, clearly distinguishable from the type of case in which courts
sometimes order specific performance and require a party to convey an interest
in land.
116. See SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 87, § 16.5(A) (“An assignment of a lease
or an interest in a lease may occur as a result of farmout, a purchase agreement,
an area-of-mutual-interest clause, or a variety of other types of contracts.”).
117. See William D. Warren, Transfer of the Oil and Gas Lessee’s Interest,
34 TEX. L. REV. 386, 386 (1956) (“No meaningful evaluation of the decisional
trends in this field of law is possible unless it is realized that in the oil and gas
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be desirable, for instance, when one company is purchased by
a competitor. It might even be true that free alienability is
more important to the oil and gas industry in particular than
it is to the larger real property market.
Nothing that has been written in this Article, however,
precludes extractors from securing the right to alienate the
extraction rights secured by an oil and gas lease. We do not
assert that the law does—or should—impose a general alienation restraint. The default rule, in the absence of a clause
restraining alienation, is that any party may alienate their
interest. Rather, our argument is simply that restraints on
alienability, when included as part of a bargained-for lease,
be enforced as written.
This distinction is critically important. If extractors want
the right to transfer the interest in an oil and gas lease, they
can bargain for a clause to that effect in the lease. Even if the
lease is silent with regard to the extractor’s alienation right,
the general presumption in favor of alienability requires that
the extractor be allowed to transfer that interest without the
consent of the landowner. Moreover, even when a restraint is
included in the lease, an extractor can always seek consent
by the landowner to a transfer; a landowner undoubtedly has
the ability to waive the alienability restraint. And a landowner who is unwilling to freely give consent might be persuaded to do so with a monetary offer.
In this sense, then, the conclusion that a restraint clause
should be enforceable is merely a plea for symmetry in the
types of arrangements that can be created by a landowner
and an extractor. There is no doubt that an extractor can secure alienation rights by a lease clause to that effect; it seems
production process the transfer of a lease is a normal, predictable event rather
than the exceptional move it constitutes in other activities involving leases of interests relating to land. Why is this so? The petroleum exploration and development process is a popular one for financial speculation. An oil strike anywhere in
the country is the signal for the onslaught of an army of professional oil-seekers.
Of these legions the lease brokers, or, colloquially, the ‘lease hounds,’ are the
shock troops, for their task is to obtain leases from landholders. Although some
of them represent major producers, many are independent operators. Each lives
and prospers by his native ability to induce the wary landowner to select him as
the surest conduit to mineral riches. Their proficiency in persuasion is legendary.
For purposes of the law of assignments the significant thing about their activities
is that brokers usually lease land for purely speculative purposes.”).
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logical, then, that a landowner should be able to preclude alienation by a clause in the lease. Permitting one result, but
not the other, limits the range of options that these contracting parties can agree to in pursuance of the development of
the minerals.
If alienation restraints in oil and gas leases are not enforced, transfers of these interests will continue without due
regard for the consequences of these transactions on the landowner. And, as illustrated herein, there can be significant
negative effects on the landowner when these transactions
occur. Allowing a landowner to bargain for restraints, and
enforcing these restraints, ensures that the costs to the landowner are taken into account when these transfers are contemplated. In this sense, only desirable transfers will occur,
considered from the perspective of all the parties who are affected by these transfers.

